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ABSTRACT  
We explore growth aspirations of young firms’ owners and managers in a post-conflict economy by focusing on 
social capital.  We treat social capital as a multi-dimensional, multi-level phenomenon; studying the effects: of 
owners’ and managers’ discussion networks’ characteristics, trust in institutions, generalised trust in people, and 
local ethnic pluralism. We argue that in a post-conflict country, ethnic pluralism is indicative of local norms of 
tolerance towards experimentation and risk taking, which supports growth aspirations. We also distinguish 
between the aspirations of hired managers and owners-managers. Our empirical counterpart and hypotheses 
testing rely on survey of young businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we focus on the effects of various determinants of social capital on growth aspirations of 
owners and managers of young businesses in a post-conflict country – Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Post 
conflict environments are fragile yet may also offer opportunities for economic turnaround, therefore call for 
particular attention (Collier, 2008). Our interest is in the micro foundations of the process of economic recovery. 
In particular, we ask what factors affect growth aspirations of young firms. Consistent with Penrose (2009 
[1959]) we posit that growth strategies of firms need to be primarily attributed to managerial capital; moreover, 
it is in the early stage of business activity, in young firms, that the growth dynamism is particularly constrained 
by management. Penrose’s (2009 [1959]) stress on management is consistent with the view that sees 
entrepreneurship being “about people in their roles as identifiers of opportunities and the exploiters of 
opportunities” (Acs, 2006, p. 195). Enterprise is as much about growth as about emergence of new firms 
(Penrose, 2009 [1959]), and growth is the critical stage of their development (Wright and Marlow, 2011). Yet 
unlike some of the open and stable economies, in a post-conflict environment growth aspirations can be easily 
damaged. In particular, where much of social capital was destroyed during the war, it becomes the key limiting 
factor affecting aspirations. It is in this context, we consider the micro-, meso- and macro-level aspects of social 
capital that affect managerial growth aspirations of young firms. We believe that our lessons apply to other post-
conflict environments; moreover we also agree with Light and Dana (2013) who stress that the general 
boundaries of social capital might become more evident in settings other than conventional.  
As will be discussed, we focus on the social links seen from the manager’s perspective. However, we treat 
social capital as a multi-dimensional and multi-level phenomenon, in particular considering social links at micro 
and meso level, with macro level treated as the context. In particular, we study the effect of owners’ and 
managers’ discussion networks on growth aspirations, and also of facets of meso-level social relations that 
support entrepreneurship, such as trust in institutions and people. We argue that in a country with weak 
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institutions, there is a wider meso-level variation compared with countries with strong institutions, where the 
institutional environment is more homogenous. In addition, we posit that in a post-conflict, multi-ethnic country, 
such as BiH, the presence of ethnic pluralism is an indicator of local social norms of tolerance that facilitate 
experimentation, competition, enterprise and growth aspirations. 
With the exception of Kwon and Arenius (2010) and Estrin, Korosteleva and Mickiewicz (2013), the social 
determinants of growth aspirations are not yet attracting the attention they deserve (e.g. Autio and Acs, 2010; 
Levie and Autio, 2011). This reflects a broader gap in the entrepreneurship literature: while there is “increased 
appreciation for the importance of social relationships in entrepreneurship” (Gedajlovic, Honig, More et al., 
2013: 455), the influence of these factors on enterprise development remains under investigated (Thornton et al., 
2011). Yet negative social and cultural influences may eradicate high growth aspirations entrepreneurship (Van 
Stel and Storey, 2004) and thus affect entrepreneurial performance. This becomes clearer, once we move away 
from a standard context like that of local settings of a mainstream developed economy, and consider alternative 
social environments (Light and Dana, 2013).   
Thus, by widening our perspective and considering a post-conflict environment deficient in social capital, we 
may also enhance our general understanding of the social phenomena supporting entrepreneurial aspirations. 
Seen within this wider context, the focus on social capital follows Granovetter’s (1985) call to avoid both 
“oversocialized” and  “undersocialized” theories: the former put stress entirely on macro-level social structures 
(e.g. Marxist-type social class analysis), while the latter model considers individuals as atomized, abstracting 
from any social features (see also: Estrin, Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2013). Accordingly, we focus on the 
links between entrepreneurship and social dimensions in a post-conflict context. It is in such case that the social 
capital may be both most fragile and most needed. We examine the case of a specific country (BiH) that is 
emerging from a recent conflict (1992-1995), yet our analysis offers lessons that may be applicable to other 
similar environments.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the introductory section, we briefly discuss the context: the ethnically 
complex post-conflict environment and current state of entrepreneurship in BiH. Next, we introduce the research 
framework and hypotheses. Subsequently, we discuss the data and model specification respectively, before 
reporting the key empirical findings. Finally, we offer conclusions. 
CONTEXT: ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
In the late '80s and early '90s of the previous century, the ex-Yugoslavia (including BiH as an ex-Yugoslav 
republic) was overwhelmed with unresolved internal political and economic issues. The (inconsistent) transition 
reforms started during this period and were supposed to strengthen the internal cohesion and bring in economic 
improvement, but in practice contributed to the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia (Hadziahmetovic, 2011). A 
four-year war began in BiH with recognition of its independence in 1992 and brought massive destruction. 
Signing the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) ended the war in 1995, yet at that moment, BiH had lost around ¼ of 
population and ¾ of its economic potential compared to 1991. Estimated GDP per capita has fallen from 1,900$ 
to around 500$ by 1995 (World Bank, 1997).  
BiH today is a middle-income country where, like in other Central and East European (CEE) nations that 
have been transiting from a planned to a market economy, the entrepreneurial growth aspirations are limited. 
Autio (2011: 259) defines high aspirations early stage entrepreneurs as owners-mangers of businesses that are 
less than 42 months old, who “expect to employ twenty or more individuals within five years’ time”. The 
prevalence rate of high aspirations entrepreneurs in BiH amongst adult population is at low 0.5%, similar to 
neighbouring Croatia and Serbia, affected by the same conflict in 1990s. This contrasts with several Latin 
American and South East Asian economies, where entrepreneurial dynamism is significantly higher, including 
between 2.0%-2.5% in China, South Korea, Peru and about 3.5% in Columbia.    
 Data on high-aspirations start-ups is consistent with figures on numbers of micro, small and medium 
enterprises that are also low for transition economies (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a); likewise levels of nascent 
entrepreneurship and new business ownership are below average. In 2010 from the transition countries 
surveyed, an estimated 7.6%1 of their population aged 18-64 was involved in starting a new business or running 
a business which was less than a year old (this figure is 7.7% for BiH), compared to 11.7% for all middle 
income economies surveyed in 2010 (Kelley, Bosma and Amorós, 2010). 
                                                          
1  Sampled transition economies in 2010 for Global Entrepreneurship Monitor are: BiH, Croatia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia.  Slovenia was also sampled but is excluded from this group 
as it is categorised as an innovation driven or higher income economy.   
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BiH as a part of ex-Yugoslavia (1945-1992) was a multi-ethnic republic with the highest level of ethnic 
tolerance (Hodson et al., 1994; Dyrstad, 2012). Unfortunately, the Bosnian war caused a structural break of the 
ethnic composition within the country, and BiH went through a radical change from ethnically tolerant to quite 
intolerant in just a few years (Dyrstad, 2012). Ethnic divisions created during the war period have largely been 
institutionalised by the constitution (Bieber, 2006). The multi-ethnic environment and pluralism was eroded, and 
preserved only in few parts of the country (Armakolas, 2011). The economic consequences of the artificially 
created new ethnic composition remain unexplored. 
An investigation of the role of trust, networks and ethnic pluralism in relation to business development is 
particularly interesting in the context of BiH, because of its ethnic and institutional structure. Three major ethnic 
groups make up the population of BiH: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats (these ethnicities largely correspond to 
Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic religious traditions respectively). The war in the 1990s caused large population 
movements outside and within BiH, leaving the population concentrated in more ethnically homogenous 
territories. Yet, ethnic minorities remain within areas dominated by Bosniak, Serb or Croat majority 
populations. Moreover, some areas avoided ethnic cleansing, preserving pluralism (Armakolas, 2011). Cultural 
differences are smaller than in other divided societies as the three groups speak virtually the same language, 
share similar traditions, and ways of thinking, which typically facilitate post-conflict reintegration (Collier, 
2008). However, DPA which ended the war brought in a complex constitution that has institutionalised ethnic 
divisions (Bieber, 2006). Each of the three main ethnic groups has substantial autonomy and control over their 
own ethno-territorial units which predominate over the state level institutions (Bieber, 2010). Consequently, and 
rather uniquely, for each ethnic group there is some part of BiH where it remains an ethnic minority and some 
part of the country where it is the ethnic majority. Although there are no official indicators (the last census was 
in 2013, but with no data available yet at time of writing; the previous one was before the war, in 1991), there is 
casual evidence that ethnic pluralism is more present in regions which were less affected by the war activities, 
and therefore preserved more social linkages dating to the pre-war period (Armakolas, 2011). All this makes 
BiH a relevant context for studying the impact of social capital and ethnic pluralism on entrepreneurial 
aspirations.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Entrepreneurial Growth Aspirations 
We follow Penrose (2009 [1959]: 30) in treating enterprise “as a psychological predisposition on the part of 
individual to take a chance in a hope of gain /…/”. Moreover, “the decision on the part of a firm to investigate 
the prospective profitability of expansion is an enterprising decision, in the sense that whenever expansion is 
neither pressing nor particularly obvious, a firm has the choice of continuing in its existing course or of 
expanding and committing resources to the investigation of whether there are further opportunities of which it is 
not yet aware. This is a decision which depends on the ‘enterprise’ of the firm” (Ibid.: 30). Penrose emphasises 
that in such a decision, it is not the resource constraints, but managerial predisposition, which is the limiting 
factor. It is within such a perspective that we turn away our attention from a production function approach that 
would investigate resource constraints, towards considering managerial attitudes, predispositions, and strategies 
adopted to acquire new knowledge. In this theoretical perspective, the question about growth aspirations 
becomes important. 
While Penrose (2009 [1959]) analysed growth decisions as dependent on managerial predispositions and 
their entrepreneurial character, one may argue that these decisions play a special role in the phase of 
entrepreneurial process when firms survived already the initial period of incubation, and they next decide if and 
how fast to expand (Messersmith and Wales, 2011). In this, we follow Estrin, Korosteleva and Mickiewicz 
(2013) who pay particular attention to growth aspirations of owners and managers of young companies, and 
more generally we build on the wider framework of those who see entrepreneurship as a process that includes 
several stages, not just a one-off transformation that creates a firm (e.g. Casson and Della Giusta, 2007; Wright 
and Marlow, 2011). The “spirit of enterprise” (Penrose, 2009 [1959]) is best captured by those companies that 
aspire to growth, in contrast with those that settle with their size defined by the initial period of establishment.  
Accordingly, our study is located within a recent strand in the entrepreneurship literature focusing on the 
individual and contextual determinants of growth aspirations (Bowen and De Clerq, 2008; Autio and Acs, 2010; 
Levie and Autio, 2011; Estrin, Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2013). However, even if one is not interested in the 
entrepreneurial process, focusing only on achieved growth, there is a substantial body of research confirming the 
positive relationship between an entrepreneur’s business aspirations and subsequent firm performance 
(Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1996; Baum et al., 1998; Baum et al., 2001; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Delmar and 
Wiklund, 2008). Thus, growth aspirations are also important, because we know that they are significantly 
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associated with the subsequent expansion of firms: managerial objectives shape actual outcomes. In turn, the 
dynamic new enterprises are drivers of economic growth (Wong et al., 2005; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). 
Based on the literature quoted above, we have some understanding of what shapes entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations. Yet, to our best knowledge, the issue has not been analysed with respect to a post conflict 
environment. It matters for two reasons. From a theoretical perspective, non-standard contexts help us to 
understand if some of the mechanisms we observe are general or not (Light and Dana, 2013). From a policy 
perspective, post-conflict environments need particular attention, because they offer both opportunities for 
economic turnaround yet face high risks of lapsing back into violence (Collier, 2008). The opportunities relate 
to breaking up some of the social and political structures that could inhibit economic dynamism in the past 
(Olson, 1982; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The threats relate to a risk that initial weak economic dynamism 
may lead to social frustration, feed into extremism, and bring back violence. It is in this context that it is 
important to understand the micro foundations of growth.   
Social Capital 
The influence of socio-cultural determinants on entrepreneurship development is still understudied concept 
(Thornton et al., 2011). We frame our analysis utilizing the concept of social capital, referring to ties between 
people (Nooteboom, 2007). At the core of the concept is the idea that goodwill stemming from social relations is 
a resource for facilitating action (Adler and Kwon, 2002), and that social linkages formed in one social sphere 
may be appropriable and used in another sphere. “Appropriability legitimates a conceptual strategy of bringing 
under the one notion /…/ informal organisation, trust, culture, social support, social exchange, social resources, 
embeddedness, relational contracts, social networks and inter-firm networks”  (Adler and Kwon, 2002: 18).   
A key division in the social capital literature is based on the level of analysis (Halpern, 2005). For some 
authors social capital is a macro-level phenomenon in the sense of characteristics shared nationwide (Putnam, 
2000), whereas others understand social capital as specific to the micro-level and belonging to individuals 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Sobel, 2002). This division also has influenced two major conceptualisations of social capital: 
one focusing on societal relations and the other on personal relations. The societal relations stream defines social 
capital as widely shared, cooperative social norms such as trust and reciprocity (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). The personal relations stream focuses on the micro structural element of 
social relations such as the properties of social networks that the individuals can use to secure benefits 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2000; Sobel, 2002). 
More generally, business appropriable social capital depends not only on the network structure of an 
individual’s social relations but also on the cognitive and normative structures that enable people to act 
collectively such as generalized and institutional trust. In this context, the meso-level becomes important. The 
latter relates to inter-group contacts (Pettigrew, 1998), where the social groups are wider than strictly personal 
networks yet narrower than macro level. Distinguishing between macro and meso level is also in the spirit of 
Granovetter’s (1985) call to avoid “oversocialized” theories; Estrin, Korosteleva and Mickiewicz (2013) build 
on his insights, applying Granovetter’s approach to determinants of entrepreneurial aspirations.  
The distinction between the meso and macro level becomes critical in societies characterised by weak 
institutions. High quality institutions create homogenous expectations based on formal rules that generate shared 
understanding, and are consistently applied. In contrast, internal conflict undermines the rule of law and formal 
authority, replacing it with local informal structures of power, such as paramilitary or criminal groups 
(Armakolas, 2011). This is likely to leave a legacy after the conflict has ended. 
Thus, in analysing the relationship between social capital and aspirations we follow suggestion by Wright 
and Stigliani (2012) and examine multiple dimensions of social capital attributing it to different societal levels 
(see Figure 1). Firstly, we examine how owners and managers relate to macro- and meso-level societal 
groupings.  We argue that societal relations affect micro-level outcomes such as business aspirations and 
analyse the impact of ethnic pluralism, institutional trust and generalised trust on growth aspirations.  Then we 
turn to personal relations, analysing the impact of discussion network composition on growth aspirations. We 
discuss all these dimensions next. 
< Figure 1> 
Trust  
Trust is seen as a key dimension of social capital (Kwon and Arenius, 2010; Westlund and Adam, 2010). It 
indicates the presence of cooperative norms in society that enable the use of social relations to access resources 
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(Paldam, 2000). Furthermore, it is seen as crucial component in the institutional structure of a market economy 
facilitating transactions (Arrow, 1974).  However, not all trust is considered equally beneficial. A key distinction 
in the literature is made between ‘particularised trust’ (Rothstein, 2003) and ‘extended’ trust (Raiser, 1999).  
Particularised trust is trust emerging between two or more individuals such as family members and friends 
(Rothstein, 2003). It is based on knowledge of the individual or the fact that they belong to a particular group 
e.g. same ethnicity.  Extended trust, in contrast, is more abstract, enabling transactions to take place with only 
limited information about the counterpart's specific attributes (Raiser, 1999). In this context, Fukuyama (2001) 
and Estrin, Mickiewicz and Stephan (2013) contrast “radius of trust” with “radius of distrust”: social capital 
build within one group may have a negative effect on relations with other groups. 
There are two main forms of extended trust: institutional trust (trust in institutions) and generalised trust 
(trust in unknown individuals). Institutional trust is trust in the functioning of the institutional framework 
including formal rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms (World Bank, 2002). It is theorised to enable 
transactions outside the circle of known individuals, extending the radius of trust, as institutions can provide 
formal mechanisms which give security that a transaction will take place as promised (Zucker, 1986). If 
institutional systems are strong, institutional trust will be high and supportive to entrepreneurship development 
and business growth (Welter, 2012). Parallel to this, generalised trust is trust in unknown individuals (Rothstein 
and Stolle, 2008) and as such is a reflection of confidence in wide social norms, i.e. the expectation of accepted 
behaviour of individuals in society in general. 
Raiser (1999) and Fukuyama (1995) argue that ‘extended trust’ is crucial to a modern market economy. 
Extended trust, unlike particularised trust, enables individuals to engage in transactions beyond closed circles of 
family or well-known business contacts, and such links are necessary for any complex division of labour. 
Extended trust offers enhanced cooperation and access to new opportunities (Rus and Iglič, 2005).  In contrast, 
low trust environments are thought to hinder entrepreneurship, because businesses have to rely on particularised 
trust through personal networks, which increases transaction costs (Hohmann and Welter, 2002). We posit that 
this is particularly damaging to entrepreneurial growth aspirations. Growth is associated with increased 
complexity of transactions, and increased risks; it is here that the low trust and the low institutional quality 
environment becomes a binding constraint. Relying on particularised trust, individuals may successfully launch 
new businesses. However, they will keep them low scale when the perceived risks associated with expansion are 
too high (Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2006; Estrin, Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2013). 
Moreover, transition economies are frequently characterised as low trust societies, due to their communist 
legacy (Fukuyama, 1995; Raiser, 1999; Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a). Trust in BiH has been further 
undermined by the recent war (UNDP, 2009).  The conflict seriously damaged the rule of law, confidence in 
formal institutions, perceptions of equality under law, and of due judicial process. War brought “the radical 
redefinition of power relations, the blurring of distinctions between legal and illegal, state and non-state” 
(Armakolas, 2011: 231). An associated shift of perceptions is persistent and slow to reverse since “the manner 
through which the rule of law is or is not upheld in wartime profoundly influences the legitimacy of the state 
and the authority it commands among the population” (Ibid.: 231). 
However, both Armakolas (2011) and Welter and Smallbone (2006) point out that trust also differs across 
regions and sectors. Norms of trust and perceptions of formal institutions can be diversified and localised. The 
way the individual entrepreneurs relate with the macro environment via institutional and generalised trust may 
also vary due to their individual characteristics, experiences and social status. De Soto (2001) argues that 
although nearly all ex-communist countries formally have universal property rights, in practice only some 
citizens, the elites, can get these formal rights enforced. Entrepreneurs coming from a poorer background and 
with fewer connections may in some countries feel less secure about their property rights or access to the legal 
system than those entrepreneurs who are better connected and wealthier (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 
2003; Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2008). The entrepreneurs feeling less secure are likely to scale down their 
growth aspirations due to threat of expropriation either by corrupt agents representing formal institutions, or by 
business partners coming from outside their radius of particularised trust; the growing size of the business 
venture would extend it beyond the radius of trust into social space of distrust. Accordingly, we hypothesise that 
the trust an individual expresses in relation to institutions (institutional trust) and to people (generalised trust) 
affects entrepreneurial growth aspirations positively. Combining the discussion above, we posit: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater entrepreneurs’ trust in institutions the higher their growth aspirations. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater entrepreneurs’ generalised trust the higher their growth aspirations. 
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Local Ethnic Pluralism 
 According to the existing literature, ethnic diversity may have both positive and negative effects on 
economic outcomes, but is still being under-investigated in empirical research (Ram et al., 2011). On the one 
hand, where ethnic diversity is associated with fragmentation and conflict, it is likely to impact negatively on 
economic performance leading to poor economic choices and policies (Easterly and Levine, 2001). Putnam 
(2007) also argues that in the short run an increase in ethnic diversity is associated with less social capital and 
solidarity, although in the long run this effect might be different.  
On the other hand, a diverse ethnic mix may bring various abilities, different experiences and ways of 
thinking, as well as a variety of cultures and traditions, which may lead businesses towards innovation, 
creativity and better economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Florida, 2004, 2005; Smallbone, 
Kitching and Athayde, 2010;  Lee, Florida and Acs, 2004). Such conditions are conducive both to a larger and 
more diversified pool ‘of underexploited knowledge useful for commercialisation of new ideas’ (Marino et al., 
2012), and to low communication barriers that make access to this knowledge and its utilisation relatively easy, 
creating an environment for entrepreneurial dynamism. Consequently, “ethnic pluralism”2 (in contrast to ‘ethnic 
fragmentation”) is a potential source of competitive advantage affecting entrepreneurial entry positively (Lee, 
Florida and Acs, 2004; Marino, Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012; Audretsch, Dohse and Niebuhr, 2010; Smallbone et 
al., 2010).  
We argue that at the meso level, ethnic pluralism in the social environment is advantageous to 
entrepreneurial growth aspirations. In BiH, relations between the ethnic groups vary immensely not just between 
regions but also at the individual level. Thus, how individuals situate themselves in their ethnic environment is 
an important facet of social capital.  It is likely that those entrepreneurs situating themselves as working in a 
more ethnically mixed area are also taking advantage of the opportunities that come with the more 
heterogeneous, but at the same time not fragmented, environment. 
More than anywhere else, in a post conflict environment the local ethnic pluralism becomes an indicator of 
the relatively stronger local climate of tolerance. During the conflict, where present, this climate slowed down 
the eruption of ethnic hatred, which in turn prevented ethnic cleansing and preserved pluralism in social tissue 
(Armakolas, 2011). More generally, experience of ethnic pluralism via frequent face to face contacts may 
diminish prejudice and “lead to a less provincial view of outgroups in general” (Pettigrew, 1998: 72). The next 
step in this process is “generalisation from the immediate outgroup to other outgroups”, that is: participation in 
inter-group links result in “greater acceptance of minorities of many types” (Pettigrew, 1998: 75). Therefore, 
experience of pluralism is associated with social norms that approve non-standard behaviour, including 
experimentation with new ways of doing things. Stephan and Uhlaner (2010) emphasize that the presence of 
such supportive social norms facilitates entrepreneurial behaviour, of which – as we discussed above – growth 
aspirations are a crucial aspect.  
Growth aspirations are also enhanced by wider access to resources that comes with ethnic heterogeneity. 
Both Aldrich and Kim (2007) and Light and Dana (2013) emphasise that start-up teams are typically formed 
relying on close-ties social neighbourhood. It is only in the expansion phase that entrepreneurs face a need to 
recruit, reaching out for competences that may be available only in the wider and more mixed communities 
(Zain and Ng, 2006; Light and Dana, 2013).  Thus, richer social links make scaling up entrepreneurial projects 
easier and therefore affects entrepreneurial aspirations positively.  
Furthermore, working in a more ethnically mixed area implies that the entrepreneur has a more diverse 
“infrastructure” available for exchange of ideas, experiences and cooperation; hence, based on these 
opportunities to increase competence and knowledge, we expect ethnic pluralism to be positively related to 
managers’ aspirations to grow their businesses. In contrast, individuals belonging to a homogenous ethnic 
majority or minority neighbourhood, in an ethnically fragmented environment, face a more narrow knowledge 
based, and this is likely to affect the entrepreneur’s growth ambitions negatively.  
Finally, it is also likely that more ethnically mixed areas create more competitive pressure: motivation to 
grow may not only result from opportunity recognition, but also from necessity: in some lines of business the 
                                                          
2 In the context of our research questions, we prefer the concept of “ethnic pluralism” (an ethnically mixed 
locality, as opposed to an ethnically fragmented locality) over “diversity” as the former term captures better the 
aspects of co-existence and of inter-ethnic cooperation that we emphasise. We are grateful to the anonymous 
reviewer for the useful discussion of this point. 
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companies may wish to expand in order to survive competitive pressure. Obviously, all these elements are not 
mutually exclusive.3 
Hence, relating ethnic pluralism to supportive social norms, availability of resources (wider recruitment base 
in particular), knowledge, and competitive pressure to grow, we state the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurs in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood (characterised by ethnic pluralism) have 
higher growth aspirations. 
Business discussion networks as social capital 
Entrepreneurs are embedded in personal networks, which may facilitate their actions (Hansen, 1995; Casson 
and Della Giusta 2007; Jack et al., 2010). Personal networks enable individuals to obtain knowledge and 
information, such as contacts for new customers, or new business opportunities (Greve and Salaff, 2003; Hoang 
and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Witt, 2004) and this is likely to feed into entrepreneurial growth aspirations. 
Networks can also provide access to different types of resources that either would not otherwise be available, or 
would be more expensive to obtain via the market. Relying on networks may be a useful strategy to overcome 
constraints to growth such as accessing finance, finding appropriately qualified human resources, and also 
dealing with institutional and regulatory obstacles such as customs regulations or obtaining commercial 
licences. This latter aspect suggests why business networks may become a substituting strategy in environments 
characterised by weak institutions and weak trust, enhancing growth aspirations of entrepreneurs (Estrin, 
Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2013). 
Moreover, the composition of individuals’ networks affects the ability of entrepreneurs to obtain a variety of 
information and resources (Raiser et al., 2007; Jack et al., 2010; Watson, 2011; Zang, 2011). A central debate in 
the literature on network structure concerns whether strong or weak ties bring more benefits to individuals 
(Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992; Greve and Salaff, 2003; Wang and Altinay, 2012). While close ties 
(especially family based) may provide the entrepreneur with emotional and motivational support, weak ties may 
result in access to non-redundant knowledge and information. However, we posit that to understand the impact 
of network structure, we need further to distinguish between acquaintances and friends (e.g. Krackhardt and 
Stern, 1988; Greve and Salaff 2003). While more valuable knowledge may indeed be found when reaching out 
beyond the family circle, the extent to which it can be effectively acquired relies on the attitudes of outside 
contacts and the degree of trust between the individuals in the network.  Obtaining valuable knowledge and 
resources from weak ties may be particularly difficult in the post-conflict environment, where the social tissue 
has been damaged, the level of trust is low, and people are unwilling to share knowledge with strangers or mere 
acquaintances. In such environments, to be able to benefit from business contacts, strong personal links need to 
be built on top of these. Accordingly, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 4: Growth aspirations are enhanced by a larger proportion of ties that are family or friends 
based (in contrast with acquaintances).  
Hired managers versus owners-managers 
In a recent paper that discusses research agenda on the entrepreneurial process, Wright and Marlow (2011: 
112) notice that “different ownership profiles critically influence entrepreneurial ambitions and activities. 
Consequently, future work needs to recognize how ownership structures profoundly affect the development of 
the venture.” This implies a call for incorporating some of the corporate governance insights into 
entrepreneurship research. Broadly speaking, these insights relate to both relations between owners, and 
relations between owners and managers; these two aspects correspond to horizontal and vertical corporate 
governance (e.g. Roe, 2008). Considering the latter, sound institutional contexts may compensate for strong 
incentives that come with ownership control in alleviating agency problems. In contrast, where institutional 
contexts are weak, such as in a post conflict environment, separation of ownership and control may have a 
particularly negative influence on the way the company is managed, and on its objectives, including growth 
ambitions.  
Thus, in a post-conflict weak institutional environment, the agency costs of separation of ownership and 
control may be higher, and hired managers may be less likely to realize owners’ objectives, if the latter imply 
adopting high growth aspirations. The managers may find it easier to rely on the informational asymmetry and 
                                                          
3 We are indebted to the anonymous referee to help us improve and extend our discussion of the links between 
the diversity in the environment and growth aspirations. 
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realize their own benefits of control, instead of taking risks that come with growth. This motivates us to 
formulate our Hypothesis 5: 
Hypothesis 5: Growth aspirations of owners-managers are higher than those of hired managers. 
 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this research we use data on young businesses obtained through a specially-designed cross-sectional 
survey implemented in the period June-August 2011. The data was gathered from the owners or managers from 
six different regions covering the two entities constituting the state of BiH – the Republic of Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The survey was administered through face-to-face meetings. We chose 
to survey firms formed between July 2005 and December 2008 to ensure a more homogenised sample, because 
the business environment for start-ups changed dramatically when the economic crisis hit BiH in 2009. By 
ending the sample period in 2008, we avoid mixing together pre-crisis young companies with those started 
during the crisis. In addition, to achieve more homogeneity, the sample does not include small firms coming 
from agriculture, forestry, fishing, or craft-workshops. The sample was stratified based on six economic regions, 
with an average of 40 companies surveyed in each region. In addition, the multi-ethnic division of BiH between 
three nationalities is represented in this sample, as each of the three dominant nationalities (Bosniaks, Serbs and 
Croats) is in majority in two out of these six regions. 734 companies that met the criteria were initially identified 
for the survey on the basis of public records. There was no size limit applied. The final number of surveyed 
companies was 244. Our response rate was 33%. Out of the 490 firms that did not take part in the survey, 
roughly 15% did not exist at the time of the survey, 10% were not at the listed address, and the remaining 75% 
did not respond for different reasons. There can be a selection bias related to the fact that some owners-
managers closed down their businesses in early stage, but like in other studies, finding them would not be easy. 
Since we are using survey data, we first checked for missing values as they may produce biased estimates, 
distort statistical assumptions, and lead to erroneous conclusions (Horton and Lispitz, 2001). Our sample has 
few missing observations and no observations are missing for the dependent variable. Model 1 is estimated with 
227 observations. However, the variables for network composition contain more missing values, so models 2 
and 3 are estimated with 166 observations. 
The list of the questions we designed to obtain data for our key variables of interest is presented in Table 1 
and summary statistics for all variables used in our econometric analysis are reported in Table 2. 
<Table 1> 
<Table 2>  
The dependent variable Employment aspirations utilises the two questions presented in the first row of Table 
1 above, which are based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor methodology (Reynolds et al., 2005). 
Combining answers, we produce a continuous variable, capturing the expected percentage change in the number 
of employees in five years time in comparison to the firm’s current situation; this design is based on Estrin, 
Korosteleva and Mickiewicz (2013). Following these authors we focus on percentage change in employment 
instead of expected level in five years time, as the percentage change better captures the relative magnitude of 
aspirations. More specifically, the dependent variable is created as the difference between the firm’s 
employment aspirations in five years time and its current number of employees, divided by the current number 
of employees. The distribution of dependent variable was left skewed with twelve observations identified as 
severe outliers (outside the outer fence, using interquartile range). These outliers had unrealistic values in the 
range of 400% - 4980% and consequently were excluded (following Autio and Acs, 2010; Estrin, Korosteleva 
and Mickiewicz, 2013). 
We measure the respondent’s perception of the ethnic pluralism in the neighbourhood where they work by 
the variable Area ethnically mixed.  Based on the question presented in Table 1, we constructed this variable to 
take: 
- a value of 1 when the respondent perceives either (a) the area is ethnically mixed, or (b) the area 
contains a balance of two or three major ethnic groups; 
- a value of 0 when the respondent perceives their ethnicity to either be (c) in the majority or (d) minority 
in their work neighbourhood.  
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Our conceptualisation that a perception of belonging to an ethnically mixed neighbourhood rather than being 
in a majority or minority indicates less polarised ethnic relationships seems to be supported by correspondence 
between our data and what we know about the ethnic composition of BiH.  For example, Mostar is a city where 
different ethnic groups (Croats and Bosniaks) live isolated from one another (in the Western and Eastern parts 
respectively). In our sample we have a reasonable balance between the two ethnicities.  However, perceptions of 
the ethnic composition of their neighbourhood fall almost unanimously into the ethnic majority category. In 
contrast, in areas such as Tuzla, where there is also a mix of ethnicities, but not the stark spatial division of 
ethnicities, this mix is associated with individuals perceiving themselves to live in an ethnically mixed area 
rather than to be in the majority or minority, entirely consistent with Armakolas (2011). This is illustrated by 
Figure 2Figure 2 below. 
<Figure 2Figure 2>  
 
Our measure for Generalised trust is based on the World Values Survey (WVS) question as presented in 
Table 1 above.  The response is dichotomous with 0 representing the answer ‘need to be very careful’ in dealing 
with people, and 1 representing the response ‘most people can be trusted’. From our sample, only 8.2% of 
respondents indicated that they possess generalised trust, certainly reflecting both the post-conflict and post-
Communist legacy (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a). Data from WVS, which samples the general population 
rather than focusing on business owners and managers (like this paper), can provide a point of comparison. In 
the 1999 - 2001 wave of WVS survey (the most recent WVS survey including BiH), 28.3% of respondents from 
all the countries sampled, but only 22.2% in a group of post-communist countries, indicated that they possessed 
generalised trust.4  Interestingly, at 8.2%, the share of managers indicating generalised trust in our sample is 
lower than found in the World Values survey of the general BiH population in 2001, where the share was 15.8% 
(WVS, 2013).  
Institutional trust is a scale formed from the respondents’ answers to the questions on their confidence in key 
institutions in BiH (following Efendic et al., 2011), as listed in Table 1 above. These answers were measured on 
a scale of 1 (no confidence at all) to 5 (a great deal of confidence). Cronbach’s Alpha (0.86) and factor analysis 
indicate that these items can be combined to form a scale. Accordingly, these individual scores were added 
together and divided by six to form a scale ranging from 1 to 5.  
In gathering data on networks, we take an ego-centric approach, obtaining data from our respondents’ on 
their personal networks. As an individual’s personal network covers all facets of their lives, personal as well as 
business, and obtaining data on a person’s whole network is time consuming and costly, we only look at a subset 
of an entrepreneur’s network – their discussion network, following Greve and Salaff (2003).  This is composed 
of the ‘people that entrepreneurs turn to when they discuss aspects of establishing and running a business’ 
(Greve and Salaff, 2003: 3).  
We measure the strength (composition) of ties in the respondents network by asking for detail on the 
strength of the tie for five members of the discussion network. It would be better to have information on all ties, 
but respondent fatigue makes such data collection very difficult. In examining the role of kin relations in 
entrepreneurship, Greve and Salaff (2003) argue that restricting the survey to five ties should be adequate. 
We define the tie to be strong if the network contact is indicated to be a member of family or a close friend 
and to be weak if the contact is classified as an acquaintance by the respondent. Following Greve and Salaff’s 
(2003) measure for kin in network, we create the variable % of external ties in network.  This is formed from 
counting the number of acquaintances named in the five most important ties in network and dividing this by 
five. As the variable is not continuous, as an alternative we also split it into four categories: no external ties 
within the first five contacts (49 respondents), one external tie (34 respondents), two external ties (48 
respondents), three-five external ties (45 respondents).   
Then, we explicitly distinguish between share of ties with family (Family/Total ties), with close friends 
(Friends/Total ties), and with acquaintances (Acquaintances/Total ties). For each of these categories we 
calculate the percentage of ties. We take the share of acquaintances as our benchmark omitted category. 
                                                          
4 In 2001 the World Values Survey was implemented in the following post-communist countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia & Ukraine. 
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Owner-manager status (Owner-manager) is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that the individual is 
both owner and manager of the firm (102 respondents) and 0 indicates all other positions. Apart from managing 
directors (74 respondents) and owners without any management position (15 respondents), other persons 
interviewed include deputy directors, deputy managers and similar key management positions in the company 
strictly delegated either by the owner or manager of the company (53 respondents). 
The remaining variables are controls. They include respondent’s characteristics and firm characteristics.  For 
firm’s characteristics we control for the current number of employees as a proxy for the firm’s size (No. of 
employees) and sector (6 sectors reported in Table 2). For respondent characteristics we include controls for 
gender (Female), age (Age) and respondent’s years of business experience (Business experience).   
We also control for discussion network size. Larger networks might be supportive in creating more 
ambitious business plans through the provision of information and resources (Witt, 2004). Larger networks have 
been found in empirical research to impact positively on business success, although the evidence is not fully 
consistent (Jenssen and Greve, 2002; Witt, 2004; Witt et al., 2008). To establish network size, we asked the 
respondents to approximate the number of people from outside their firm with whom they discussed aspects of 
running their business (see Table 1). Network size ranges from 0 to 300 but with 90% of the sample falling in 
the range 1 to 30. The size of the network does not have a continuous distribution above the value of eight. 
There are a few high peaks in distribution, starting with ten; these were clearly taken by the respondents as 
approximations. Accordingly, we categorised the variable, using cut-off points that partition the empirical 
distribution into four roughly equal parts. This lead to size of discussion networks categories at 0-3, 4-9, 10, and 
above 10. 
    
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The benchmark specification which should capture the factors affecting business aspirations of BiH's young 
businesses has the following form (corresponding to Model 1 below): 
ܧ݉݌݈݋ݕ݉݁݊ݐ	ܽݏ݌݅ݎܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜
ൌ 0ˆ ൅ ߚመଵܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ݐݎݑݏݐ௜ ൅ ߚመଶܩ݁݊݁ݎ݈ܽ݅ݏ݁݀	ݐݎݑݏݐ௜ ൅ ߚመଷ	ܣݎ݁ܽ	݁ݐ݄݈݈݊݅ܿܽݕ	݉݅ݔ݁݀௜
൅ ߚመସܰ݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇ᇱݏ	݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ	݈݅݊݇ݏ ൅ ߚመହܱݓ݊݁ݎ݉ܽ݊ܽ݃݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଺෢ሺܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏሻ௜ ൅ ࢄࢼ ൅ iˆ  
Indices ‘i’ represent companies 1-244, ߚመ଴  is the constant term, ߚመଵିହ  are coefficients of variables to be 
estimated that correspond with hypotheses 1-5, Xβ represents the matrix of sectoral fixed effects, while the error 
term is denoted with ˆ . The hypotheses and variables used to test them as well as the expected signs are 
summarised in Table 3Table 3. Generalised trust, Institutional trust and Area ethnically mixed, and Owner-
manager are all expected to come with positive sign, consistent with Hypotheses 1-3 and 5. To test our 
Hypothesis 4, consistent with the discussion in the previous section, we use: share of external ties 
(External/Total ties), categorisation of this variable, and finally we introduce two categories of ties instead 
(Model 4) - family (Family/Total ties) and friends (Friends/Total ties), taking acquaintances as a third omitted 
category. 
< Table 3Table 3>  
We control for network size, respondent’s characteristics (gender, age, business experience), and firm’s 
characteristics (firm size and sector). We include network size to account for the possibility that the share of 
external ties masks the effect of larger size, when the latter is omitted from the model. We expect larger size 
(No. of employees) to have positive effect on the level of growth aspirations of young firms, consistent with 
empirical evidence that suggest persistence in growth (Wagner, 1992). We expect male gender (Male) to have 
positive effect on aspirations (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011b). We do not have a clear prediction on the effect of 
age of the respondent (Age) on growth aspirations, as the results in the literature are mixed (Parker, 2009). A 
conventional view might be that more experience could be associated with higher aspirations (Business 
experience) indicating a positive sign. In addition, the model controls for different business sectors. Finally, the 
variables we introduced to represent education were statistically insignificant and/or proved to be incompatible 
with model diagnostics. Hence, these influences are not included in the final model. A table of correlations 
between the main variables of interest is reported below. 
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<Table 4>  
 
RESULTS 
The specifications are estimated by OLS regression in Stata 13 and reported in Table Table 5.  
<Table Table 5> 
We tested our econometric model to ensure correct functional form, and used robust standard errors to 
mitigate problems with heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, we found no indication of serious multicollinearity in 
our specifications: the variance inflation factor (VIF) ranges between 2.52 and 3.92 for our variables. While 
conventional threshold of VIF = 10 may be considered too high (Cohen et al., 2003), the VIFs in our models are 
far below. In taking both dependent and independent variables from a cross-sectional survey, endogeneity is 
always a matter of concern.  In our study, network size and growth aspirations may be considered particularly 
problematic as they may be simultaneously defined – individuals with higher growth aspirations may decide to 
grow their networks in order to meet their aspirations as well as network size having an effect on growth 
aspirations. However, our variables are constructed so that growth aspirations are forward-looking (we ask 
about employment growth aspirations for the next five years) and network size is backward-looking (we ask 
about the networks in the last six months). Furthermore, networks are built and developed slowly overtime, 
particularly in a low-trust environment and the current network size includes the whole history of network of 
any particular person. Thus we believe that simultaneity between network size and aspirations is not a serious 
problem for our study.  
Now, we move on to the presentation of results reported in Table Table 5. Institutional trust, capturing 
(formal) institutional environment is statistically significant in all reported models, at 1% level in Model 1 based 
on larger sample, and between 1% - 5% level in Models 2-4 based on smaller samples. It correlates positively 
with growth aspirations in every model reported, supporting Hypothesis 1. Thus, those individuals who have 
greater confidence in formal institutions report higher growth aspirations. In contrast, we find no evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 2 - the degree of generalised trust is not statistically significant in any of the models. This 
may in part be due to the lack of variability in our measure of generalised trust which is only a dichotomous 
variable.  
Next, ethnically mixed areas are characterized by systematically greater growth aspirations in comparison to 
more homogenous areas, clearly supporting Hypothesis 3, at 1‰ level in Model 1 (larger sample), and at 1% in 
Models 2-4 (smaller sample).  To verify if our results are indeed related to ethnic pluralism and not enforced by 
categorisation and by combining the answers’ categories, we also applied alternative specifications (unreported 
but available on request) where we distinguish between majority and minority perceptions using separate Ethnic 
majority and Ethnic minority variables. However, according to the Wald test, the difference between the 
coefficients for Ethnic majority and Ethnic minority is statistically insignificant. Consequently, we use Area 
ethnically mixed in our final models. 
To investigate the relationship between the composition of networks and aspirations (Hypothesis 4) we first 
apply the External/Total ties variable (Model 2), defining – as discussed above – the strength of the network ties 
in terms of external weak ties versus internal strong ties. We find a highly significant effect (at 1‰), suggesting 
that the proportion of strong ties rather than weak ties is positively related to business aspirations. Next in Model 
3, we replace this measure with categorisation of the external ties indicator. The significance of the effect 
increases with the share of external contacts. Remarkably, the aspirations are lowered by half, for the 
respondents whose business discussion networks are dominated by acquaintances (3 or more out of 5 contacts), 
compared with the respondents whose five first business discussion partners consist entirely of family or friends. 
To further test the robustness of our result on network composition, in Model 4, we next distinguish between 
family-based strong ties (Family/Total ties), friends-based strong ties (Friends/Total ties) and ties with 
acquaintances. While it appears that the proportion of friends-based strong ties has a stronger effect on business 
aspirations compared with the family-based strong ties; when we performed the Wald test on difference between 
these coefficients, it came out as insignificant. It is not the difference between family and others but the 
difference between family and friends versus others that matters. 
With respect to the distinction between owners-managers and hired managers, we found support for 
Hypothesis 5; that is owners-managers exhibit higher growth aspirations. Consistent with Model 1, owners-
manager are characterised by 20% higher growth aspirations compared with hired managers. The result is 
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significant at conventional 5% level, but weaker once the sample becomes smaller in Models 2-4 (significant at 
10%). 
With respect to our controls, we find that a large network size (over 10 people in business discussion 
network) is significant at 5% and positively associated with higher aspirations in Model 1, but again the 
significance level is at 10% when the size of the sample becomes smaller and the composition variables are 
added. In particular, being a female has a positive and significant effect in the model suggesting that females 
have systematically higher growth aspirations than males. This result goes against conventional findings (see, 
for example, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011b) and is rather surprising, as BiH’s society still might be considered 
as rather patriarchal society in which women are less engaged in the social, political, and economic aspects of 
life compared to men (Somun-Krupalija, 2011). It may be that our results are driven by self-selection: in such a 
climate, where the obstacles to female entrepreneurship are higher, only the most ambitious women succeed in 
becoming entrepreneurs. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We deal with the influence of multiple dimensions of social capital on entrepreneurial growth aspirations, in 
a post-conflict context. We develop hypotheses that relate to the aspirations of the managers of young 
businesses. Following Penrose (2009 [1959]) we take managers seriously, as we do not see companies as black 
boxes, where different input combinations produce alternative outcomes. Growth results from entrepreneurial 
ambitions, and the latter belong to entrepreneurs. However, what makes the question particularly interesting is a 
non-standard context, where entrepreneurs’ ambitions may be seriously affected by their social linkages and 
perceptions, as they operate in an environment hostile to business expansion. 
Consistent with this, we consider social dimensions of ethnic pluralism, institutional and generalised trust, 
and business network composition in the post-conflict context, which implies that social capital is fragile yet it 
also matters greatly. In addition, in this challenging institutional environment, the difference in aspirations 
between owners-managers and hired managers may become particularly important. 
We found that the institutional trust exhibited by a manager is associated with stronger business aspirations. 
Considerable variation in the individual level of institutional trust suggests that aspects of social capital that 
have been attributed to the nationwide level (Fukuyama, 1995) have more localised character, and this applies in 
particular to societies emerging from internal conflicts. This links to an observation by De Soto (2001), who 
opens his institutional analysis by noticing how much the institutional perceptions in the same country differ 
amongst the business people located in different environments. Thus, we argue that a micro perspective on 
formal institutions is valuable, as in a post-conflict weak institutional context there is a significant variance in 
individual experience of institutions, and better experience is associated with more entrepreneurial dynamism. 
Thus, from the policy perspective, our findings suggest that much can be achieved by emulating already existing 
best local practice. The latter policy approach will also come with lower risks related to ‘institutional 
transplants’ from far away (Mamadouh, De Jong and Lalenis, 2002). 
We argue next that in context where ethnic tensions are a salient issue, local ethnic pluralism is an important 
factor affecting employment growth aspirations via norms of tolerance supporting experimentation, via broader 
knowledge base and via wider access to resources, human capital in particular. We found that managers in local 
areas that are ethnically mixed rather than fragmented and polarised into majority and minority groups, have 
higher growth aspirations. These results are important when seen in the context of the cross-country economic 
literature, as the latter suggests that ethnic fractionalisation may be associated with negative economic 
outcomes. This conclusion may be correct to the extent the fractionalisation is associated with likelihood of 
internal conflicts. However, Collier (2008) argues that ethnic diversity in the post conflict context is associated 
with lower risks where some basic democratic institutions are in place, as in our case.  
While the strength of business ties in the literature is recognized as a potential determinant of business 
aspirations, the empirical results are ambiguous (Greve and Salaff, 2003). We offer a suggestion where the 
ambiguity may be coming from. While strong ties provide young businesses with limited amount of new 
knowledge, networks based on external weak ties may potentially offer more valuable resources. Yet, in a weak 
trust environment, these will not be utilised effectively, unless the external ties become considerably 
strengthened. This is captured by the difference between acquaintances and friends. In the latter case, trust, 
resulting from transforming external ties into stronger ones, enables managers of young businesses to access 
more valuable knowledge. 
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Moreover, here we can bring together our evidence on network composition and institutional trust and 
contrast it with insignificant results on generalised trust. What this may suggest is that managers of young 
companies may rely on their local discussion networks to compensate for lack of (generalised) trust in strangers. 
However, it is more difficult to compensate for obstacles created by formal institutions: it may be this difficulty 
in finding alternative managerial strategies that explains why the local perception of formal institutions plays 
such a significant role. Our results echo Aidis and Mickiewicz (2006) who found that while experience of weak 
institution (as exemplified by corruption) was not prevalent amongst businesses in a transition country 
(Lithuania), it did affect growth expectations the most: the businesses that encountered corruption in their local 
environment did reduce their growth aspirations significantly. 
Finally, in weak institutional contexts, ownership matters. Owners-managers of young companies exhibit 
higher growth aspirations than hired managers. We posit that in such a context, alignment of objectives is more 
difficult between owners and hired managers. We expected to find this positive divergence, but we should note 
that there are also some counterarguments. Owners may be more entrepreneurial than managers, but it may also 
be that they are less willing to take onto themselves risks that come with growth, as they have more at stake, and 
they may also be driven by independence motive, which suggest less risk taking and less debt taking; the latter 
being typically associated with expansion (Penrose 1959 [2009]). It turned out, that in the context we consider, 
owners-managers are indeed more entrepreneurial than hired managers as documented by their growth 
aspirations. This has clear practical implications for entrepreneurs, as founders of such companies should be 
aware of the trade-offs involved. 
While this study is based on one country, we believe that our framework is applicable to other post-conflict 
environments that suffered from ethnic hatred and violence and are in a process of reconstruction. This also 
suggests lines of future research. A clear limitation of this study is that we cannot be sure if our conclusions 
would be supported if extrapolated to other locations, with different cultural contexts, formal institutions, and 
ethnic composition. It would also be useful to have a similar comparator country with no history of conflict and 
ethnic divisions. Another valuable extension would be to consider the decision to start a company and 
subsequent growth aspirations jointly, based on a longitudinal design. 
Our findings highlight the importance of different social determinants for policies aimed at supporting young 
business development and have particular resonance for post-conflict areas. The entrepreneurs' trust in 
institutions as well as stronger social ties beyond the family circle are both associated with higher business 
growth aspirations. Equally important, ethnic pluralism is an opportunity not a threat: in the regions where 
ethnic pluralism is preserved, business aspirations are stronger.  
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Table 1: Questions used to obtain data for key variables 
Variable name  Question 
Employment aspirations What is the total number of employees in your enterprise currently?  
What is the total number of employees in your enterprise expected in 5 years time?  
Area ethnically mixed In the neighbourhood where you work now, is your ethnic group in the  
(1) majority 
(2) minority 
(3) there is a balance between two or three major groups  
(4) it is diverse  
Generalised trust  Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
(1) Most people can be trusted 
(2) Need to be very careful 
Institutional trust For each one, could you please tell me how much confidence you have in 
- The state government 
- Entity and cantonal government 
- Municipal authority 
- Tax administrations 
- The Office of the High Representative  
- The Courts  
(1) a great deal, (2) quite a lot, (3) average, (4) not very much, (5) none at all 
Network size Thinking about the last 6 months, with approximately how many people from 
outside your firm do you discuss aspects of running your business either to get 
new information, advice or to check your own ideas?  
% external ties  Please can you think about the people from outside your firm with whom you 
regularly discuss aspects of running your own business. Write down the initials for 
up to 5 of them (Interviewer asked about each person). Is this contact a: 
(1) Acquaintance 
(2) Close friend  
(3) Family member  
Owners-managers versus 
hired managers 
Are you the owner of this firm?      
Are you the manager of this firm?      
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Mean Median SD Min Max No. obs 
Employment aspirations 
(expected change in number of employees) 
6.53 0.5 41.41 -1 498.5 243 
Area ethnically mixed  
(mixed = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.14 0 0.34 0 1 243 
Ethnic majority  
(majority = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.80 1 0.40 0 1 243 
Ethnic minority  
(minority = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.06 0 0.24 0 1 243 
Generalised trust 
(most people can be trusted: yes = 1, no = 0) 
0.08 0 0.27 0 1 243 
Institutional trust  
(confidence in institutions: none = 1, a great deal =5) 
2.46 2.5 0.72 1 4.3 243 
      
% of external ties in network 
(no external ties = 0, all ties external = 1) 
0.32 0.4 0.27 0 1 176 
Owner-manager of firm 
(respondent owner-manager of firm=1, otherwise= 0) 
0.42 0 0.49 0 1 243 
Network size (continuous)  
(no. of people in discussion network) 
14.49 9 31.66 0 300 243 
Network size 0 – 3 
(network size: 0-3 people = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.30 0 0.46 0 1 243 
Network size 4 -9  
(network size: 4-9 people = 1, otherwise =0) 
0.20 0 0.40 0 1 243 
Network size 10  
(network size: 10 people = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.26 0 0.44 0 1 243 
Network size over 10 
(network size: 11+ = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.23 0 0.42 0 1 243 
Feale 
(male = 0, female = 1)  
0.33 1 0.42 0 1 243 
Age  
(Age of respondents in years) 
38.63 38 9.80 20 79 243 
Business experience 
(Business experience in years) 
9.98 7 7.66 1 40 243 
      
No. of employees 
(current number of employees) 
11.01 4 28.99 1 400 243 
Manufacturing 
(firm’s main sector manufacturing = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.09 0 0.29 0 1 243 
Hotels 
(firm’s main sector hotels) 
0.03 0 0.18 0 1 243 
Construction 
(firm’s main sector construction = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.06 0 0.24 0 1 243 
Transport 
(firm’s main sector transport = 1, otherwise = 0)  
0.03 0 0.17 0 1 243 
Trade 
(firm’s main sector trade = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.45 0 0.50 0 1 243 
Business services  
(firm’s sector business services=1, otherwise=0) 
0.33 0 0.47 0 1 243 
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Table 3: Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis  Variable used to test hypothesis Expected sign 
H1: The greater entrepreneurs’ trust in institutions, the 
higher their growth aspirations. 
Institutional trust + 
H2: The greater entrepreneurs’ generalised trust, the 
higher their growth aspirations. 
Generalised trust 
 
+ 
H3: Entrepreneurs in an ethnically mixed 
neighbourhood have higher growth aspirations. 
Area ethnically mixed + 
H4: Growth aspirations are enhanced by a larger 
proportion of ties that are strong (family and friends 
based).  
External/Total ties - 
H5a: Growth aspirations of owners-managers are 
higher. 
H5b: Growth aspirations of hired managers are higher. 
Owner-manger 
 
Owner-manager 
+ 
 
- 
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Table 4: Correlations  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Employment Aspirations  1 
2 Area Ethnically Mixed -0.05  1 
3 Institutional Trust -0.10  0.03  1 
4 Generalised Trust -0.04  0.10  0.01  1 
5 Network size 4-9 -0.04  0.11†  0.02 -0.07  1 
6 Network size 10  0.02  0.03  0.09 -0.01 -0.30***  1 
7 Network size over 10 -0.06  0.01  0.07 -0.02 -0.27*** -0.33***  1 
8 External / Total Ties  0.19* -0.23** -0.19* -0.04 -0.09  0.03  0.01  1 
9 Family / Total Ties -0.06  0.05  0.19* -0.04  0.06  0.02  0.05 -0.55***  1 
10 Friends / Total Ties -0.17*  0.23**  0.06  0.08  0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.73*** -0.17*  1 
11 Owner-Manager -0.05  0.05 -0.14* -0.01  0.10 -0.12†  0.00 -0.09  0.03  0.08  1 
12 Male -0.01  0.01  0.05  0.09 -0.12†  0.07  0.07  0.16*  0.13† -0.29*** -0.21**  1 
13 Age  0.11† -0.01  0.04  0.02 -0.02  0.09  0.02 -0.02  0.09 -0.05  0.03 -0.08  1 
14 Business Experience  0.02  0.08  0.08 -0.11†  0.01  0.22** -0.04 -0.20**  0.28***  0.01 -0.05 -0.02  0.49***  1 
15 Number of Employees -0.03  0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05  0.12†  0.05  0.03  0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02  0.11 
 
***p<0.001 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 
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Table 5: OLS regression – the dependent variable: employment growth aspirations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Area Ethnically Mixed 0.442*** 0.384** 0.369** 0.382** 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.120) (0.121) 
Institutional Trust 0.191** 0.152* 0.167* 0.153* 
 (0.062) (0.076) (0.079) (0.075) 
Generalised Trust 0.034 -0.057 -0.001 -0.058 
 (0.137) (0.142) (0.163) (0.145) 
External / Total Ties  -0.681***   
  (0.178)   
1/5 external tie   -0.308*  
   (0.145)  
2/5 external ties   -0.311*  
   (0.141)  
3/5 - 5/5 external ties   -0.501***  
   (0.129)  
Family / Total Ties    0.638** 
    (0.244) 
Friends / Total Ties    0.706** 
    (0.229) 
Owner-Manager 0.196* 0.168† 0.181† 0.169† 
 (0.081) (0.097) (0.095) (0.098) 
Network size 4-9 0.102 0.073 0.082 0.076 
 (0.114) (0.143) (0.145) (0.143) 
Network size 10 0.069 0.030 0.052 0.030 
 (0.113) (0.155) (0.156) (0.156) 
Network size over 10 0.275* 0.304† 0.322† 0.306† 
 (0.118) (0.168) (0.169) (0.169) 
Female 0.178† 0.286** 0.256* 0.294** 
 (0.096) (0.103) (0.105) (0.110) 
Age -0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Business Experience 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Number of Employees -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufacturing 0.067 0.125 0.104 0.126 
 (0.135) (0.156) (0.162) (0.156) 
Hotels and Restaurants -0.301* -0.300* -0.305* -0.292* 
 (0.149) (0.143) (0.149) (0.142) 
Construction -0.073 0.002 -0.023 0.004 
 (0.223) (0.259) (0.250) (0.261) 
Transport 0.327 0.285 0.208 0.296 
 (0.334) (0.353) (0.348) (0.353) 
Professional and Business Services -0.010 0.059 0.034 0.059 
 (0.094) (0.114) (0.116) (0.114) 
Constant -0.094 0.138 0.126 -0.555* 
  (0.226) (0.283) (0.290) (0.262) 
Observations 227 166 166 166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.144 0.209 0.206 0.204 
F 3.792 4.869 4.669 4.632 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 
